JUSTICE WORRALL F. MOUNTAIN:
AN APPRECIATION
Robert L. Clifford*
I can hardly see the use of writing judicial opinions unless they are
to embody methods of analysis and of exposition which will serve
the profession as a guide to the decision of future cases. If they are
not better than an excursion ticket, good for this day and trip only,
they do not serve even as protective coloration for the writer of the
opinion and would much better be left unsaid.
Justice Harlan F. Stone. 1
I think it fair to assume that Justice Worrall F. Mountain would
agree with this apt statement of the purpose underlying carefully
crafted judicial opinions. When one reflects, on the occasion of Justice Mountain's retirement from the New Jersey Supreme Court, on
the enormous contribution made to our jurisprudence by his opinions, one recognizes immediately that they have revealed a commitment to the salutary philosophy embodied in Justice Stone's extrajudicial comment. Indeed, perhaps more than any other member of
the Court, Justice Mountain has demonstrated the ability to maintain
the dual focus characteristic of our greatest jurists: deciding this case
on these facts, while maintaining a cautious eye on the impact a given
principle may have in future cases.
The importance of maintaining a proper balance between these
two elements of the jurisprudential product cannot be overstated. To
take too narrow a view in writing an opinion may deprive counsel and
the lower courts of needed guidance for future cases. Indeed, the
responsibility to provide such guidance is inherent in the requirement that cases be disposed of by written opinion. 2 Yet to stray too
far beyond the bounds of the case at hand is to indulge in the writing
of advisory opinions that may simply delight the law book publishers
rather than enrich the collective body of jurisprudence. 3
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It is not only the bench and bar who must be kept in mind in
drafting an opinion. The ultimate legitimacy of the judicial branch
depends upon public confidence in its workings, a confidence that
depends at least in part on the issuance of decisions that set forth
reasoned principles applied to specific facts. It was concern that the
judiciary could not adequately perform this function in the field of
zoning reform to the satisfaction of the bar and public alike that
prompted Justice Mountain's concurring and dissenting opinion in
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison. 4 He feared that
the necessary reliance by the courts upon experts in fashioning remedies in such cases "will reflect rather the informed judgment of the
chosen expert than a judicial application of settled principle to particular facts. Full realization of this is likely further to diminish the
5
possibility of community acceptance."
The proper balance between declaration and decision is wellillustrated by Justice Mountain's authorship of the series of opinions
on equitable distribution which fleshed out the 1971 amendments to
the New Jersey statutes governing divorce. In Painter v. Painter6 and
Rothman v. Rothman, 7 he took on for the Court the delicate task of
construing the term "equitable distribution," a concept which drastically revised the State's laws governing property distribution. Both
opinions set forth soundly-based principles which, while applicable to
the facts at hand, have become the basic guidelines for counsel and
matrimonial judges in dealing with the difficult practical aspects of
8
separating no-longer-willing marital partners.
In these cases and others Justice Mountain has evolved a classic
style, not merely in the fulfillment of Justice Stone's requirements,
set forth at the beginning of this piece, 9 but also in the mastery of
such details as command of language, structuring of opinions, elucidation of legal reasoning, and impeccable use of authority. Examples of
his consummate craftsmanship abound in each of these categoriesmore in number than this article can properly accommodate. What
follow are merely illustrative instances, representative but by no
means exhaustive.
4 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977).
5 Id. at 626, 371 A.2d at 1265 (Mountain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

6 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
7 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
8 Later decisions by Justice Mountain further developing the principles laid down in
Painter and Rothman in the same reasoned and comprehensive fashion include, Smith v. Smith,

72 N.J. 350, 371 A.2d 1 (1977), Carlsen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. 363, 371 A.2d 8 (1977), and Stern v.
Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
9 See text accompanying note 1.
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We might start with a favorite passage demonstrating Justice
Mountain's facility for artful and succinct expression, in a decision
written while he was sitting in chancery, wherein he rejected an insured's claim that due to an ambiguity, his contract of insurance
should be construed to afford coverage:
In the first place, it is important to bear in mind the difference
between complexity and ambiguity. This was a complex underwriting transaction; it did not lend itself to simplicity of expression or
format. Complexity born of necessity is not to be confused with
ambiguity, whether accidental or artful. 10
The use of precedent in the field of property law was skillfully
brought to bear in Newman v. Chase," which resolved the thorny
problem of the remedies to be afforded the judgment creditor seeking
satisfaction from an estate held in tenancy by the entirety. Faced with
uncertainty in case law as to the exact nature and quaility of that
estate peculiar to the marital relationship, Justice Mountain relied on
the social policy expressed in relevant legislation in concluding that
courts are invested with equitable discretion to grant or deny partition according to the merits of a given situation. 12 While Newman
has been unfairly criticized as having trod upon the legislative province,13 in fact the decision is an object lesson in the harmonizing
construction of legislation and case law.
For organization and legal exposition one can turn to any of Justice Mountain's opinions to find the methodical discussion of precedent followed by the fashioning of appropriate principles and their
application to the relevant facts. A recent example is In re Farber,14
a decision attracting national interest, in which Justice Mountain was
assigned the sensitive task of balancing the rights of a free press with
the rights of a criminal defendant. In the otherwise highly-charged
atmosphere infecting that case the opinion stands as an oasis of reason
and rationality.
Such a considered style as is revealed in Justice Mountain's body
of work cannot exist independently of an ordered mind in which all
decisions are principled ones, in form as well as in substance. Indeed,
10 Bryan Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 181, 184, 264
A.2d 752, 754 (Ch. Div. 1970), aff'd, 116 N.J. Super. 88, 281 A.2d 97 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 60 N.J. 375, 1290 A.2d 138 (1972).

11 70 N.J. 254, 359 A.2d 474 (1976).
12 Id.
13

at 264-65, 359 A.2d at 479.
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his stylistic approach seems to have an analog in a judicial philosophy
that is admittedly conservative, especially as respects the role of the
judiciary in a tripartite form of government. 1 5 An innate sense of
order and restraint also manifests itself in Justice Mountain's attitude
concerning the relationship of a single judge to the Court as a whole.
While disagreement with one's colleagues is an inevitable aspect of
sitting on an appellate court, he has always been a reluctant dissenter, being of the view that one should dissent only out of a deep
personal conviction.16 Nevertheless, when conviction has moved him
to speak in dissent, he has always couched his disagreement in the7
same reasoned and precise manner as marks his majority opinions.
Taking issue with the majority in Anderson v. Somberg, 18 Justice
Mountain showed himself to be a master of understatement:
This Court has reached an extraordinary result in a very remarkable way. As I shall hope to make clear, the structure of argument as presented in the Court's opinion is rested upon an assumed factual premise which does not exist. In part because of
this, the concluding and most significant part of the argument suffers from the defect of visiting liability, in a wholly irrational way,
upon parties who are more probably than not totally free of blame.
I respectfully dissent.
I of course agree with the Court that it is most unfortunate
that this plaintiff should go uncompensated. Every humanitarian
instinct impels the hope that when an unconscious patient is injured in some unforeseen and unforeseeable way, due reparation
will be forthcoming. It is to the manner in which the Court would
seek to fulfill this hope that I object. 19

No bombast. No querulous remonstration. None of the churlish carping which unfortunately sometimes creeps into other minority opinions one might read elsewhere (including, I very much regret to
say-but must because my clerks insist it is so-some of those
emanating from these chambers). just the same temperate, measured,
almost stately quality of expression that characterizes Justice
15 See Boeche, Justice Mountain: An Ivory Tower Man Steps Down, The Daily Record
(Morristown, N.J.), June 19, 1979, at 18 (Northwest N.J. ed.).
16 The Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), June 29, 1979 at 18, col. 4-5.
'7 See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 162-66, 358 A.2d 457, 460-62 (Mountain, J.,
dissenting), injunction dissolved, 70 N.J. 465, 360 A.2d 400 (1976); Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 623--31, 371 A.2d 1192, 1263-67 (1977) (Mountain, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Is 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1975).
11 Id. at 305-06, 308 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
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Mountain's writings for the majority-an attitude which prompted
the New Jersey Law Journal to observe the departure from the Court
of Justice Mountain's "pristine Dickensian prose." 20
Finally, I am reminded of Professor Charles Fried's recent complaint that the drastic decrease in the esthetic quality of the subject
has made the study of law "much less fun." 2 ' Particularly he asks
one to
[c]ompare judicial opinions of today to those of, let's say 40 or 50
years ago; they are prolix, use inflated rhetoric, full of pompous
and sociology, and are
moralisms, replete with amateur economics
22
sprinkled with barbarous neologisms.

Justice Mountain has stood against this flow. Those of us who have
been given the privilege of serving with him have come to regard
him-again in Professor Fried's words-as "a public resource, an intellectual anchor to windward, a source of structure, stability and
sanity." 23
Only a gentleman and a scholar could say in his judicial opinions
what Worrall Mountain has said, in just the way he has said it.

21
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